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Author(s): Ryan E. Carlin, Mason Moseley

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Good Democrats, Bad Targets: Democratic Values and Clientelistic Vote Buying

Ryan E. Carlin, Georgia State University
Mason Moseley, Vanderbilt University

Who do parties target for clientelistic vote buying? Existing research looks almost exclusively at individuals' socioeconomic and, especially, electoral profiles—which parties and candidates they support, professed ideological leanings, past voting turnout, and choice. We argue party brokers also consider democratic attitudinal profiles. Specifically, they are more likely to avoid full-fledged democrats and target citizens who are ambivalent to or reject core democratic principles. We test this proposition with the 2010 Argentina AmericasBarometer. To address selection bias on observables and unobservables, respectively, we preprocess the data with entropy balancing and employ instrumental variables regression. Results from both strategies are consistent with the notion that democrats are less likely vote-buying targets than their less democratic counterparts. Effect sizes are on par with or exceed other theoretical variables, and the results are robust to a variety of checks and specifications.

In many democracies, the exchange of material rewards for electoral support is as routine as elections themselves.¹ But who receives these offers? Certainly not everyone, even where such practices flourish. Scholars agree parties generally target the poor but debate targets' electoral profiles, namely their political, ideological, and/or partisan preferences and behavioral patterns, such as vote choice and turnout propensity. Studying socioeconomic and electoral profiles has undeniably advanced our understanding of vote buying, a phenomenon of interest to democratic theorists and with serious normative consequences. Yet our knowledge of who parties target remains incomplete. Insights into party brokers' motivations, the fluidity of political identity in clientelistic systems, and citizen attitudes toward vote buying imply other strategies may exist.

We propose brokers can distinguish good vote-selling prospects from bad ones based on their attitudes toward democratic procedures, processes, and norms. We view such democratic attitude profiles not as substitutes for socioeconomic and electoral profiles, but rather as supplemental or

complementary information about the chances of successfully buying a target's vote. Below we develop this theory, test its observable implications, and conclude with a discussion of how it contributes to our knowledge of the phenomenon of vote buying.

MODELS OF CLIENTELISTIC VOTE BUYING

Clientelistic vote buying is “the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote” (Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004, 67). Besides the poor, whose votes do parties seek to buy? The exact model is disputed, but scholars concur on two assumptions. First, machine parties and their operatives invest finite and scarce resources in citizens who match one of several electoral profiles. Second, operatives learn who fits these profiles via dense social networks that provide rich information about would-be vote-sellers' political orientations and behavioral tendencies. Let us briefly review these arguments and relate them to our theory.

Ryan Carlin is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, 38 Peachtree Center Ave., Suite 1005, Atlanta, GA 30303-2514. Mason Moseley received his PhD in 2014 from Vanderbilt University and is a postdoctoral fellow at the Program on Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism (DCC) at the University of Pennsylvania, 3440 Market St., Philadelphia, PA 19104-3335.

1. An online appendix for this article is available at the “Supplements” link at the top of this page. Data and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results can be found on the Latin American Public Opinion Project website (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/) and on www.sites.google.com/site/ryanecarlin/, respectively.

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In Cox and McCubbins' model, parties divide the electorate into support, swing, and opposition groups and target supporters for material transfers because, as "known quantities" (1986, 378), they are less risky investments than swing voters who are "open" (379) to competing candidates. However, this strategy is inefficient if core voters are predisposed to vote for the candidate, yet swing voters ultimately decide the election. And if swing voters are more ideologically moderate or, to a point, indifferent between candidates, rewards are particularly decisive for them (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Stokes 2005). Yet core versus swing presents a false dichotomy; parties invest in both. Diversified approaches include targeting core and swing voters with different types of goods (Albertus 2013; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Rosas, Pereyra-Johnston, and Hawkins 2013) or building heterogeneous networks of core and swing voters but distributing benefits selectively (Stokes et al. 2013).

Other models integrate behavioral patterns. According to Nichter (2008), machine parties engage in "turnout buying" for core constituents who would not otherwise vote, rather than attempt to persuade moderate opposers. For Dunning and Stokes (2008), parties buy the votes of swing and weakly opposing voters who are certain to vote and buy the turnout of ideological loyalists uncertain to vote. Stokes et al. (2013), however, argue brokers' goals of organization building and rent seeking may incentivize them to reward loyalists regardless of their turnout propensity over swing voters certain to turn out, resulting in heterogeneous clientelist networks. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2013) identify several portfolios of electoral clientelism consisting of vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double persuasion.

Beyond the assumptions that clientelistic party brokers target the poor and those who fit specific electoral profiles, extant models also assume brokers acquire this knowledge through "deep insertion in voters' social networks" (Stokes 2005, 315). As Stokes concludes, "There are two kinds of private information about the voter that are useful to the party: his actions—which party he votes for—and his type—his partisan predisposition in relation to the two parties. Machines are good at gathering information about voters' actions and types" (2005, 317). Ethnographic works contain similar assertions (e.g., Auyero 2000; Swarcberg 2009).

GOOD DEMOCRATS, BAD TARGETS FOR VOTE BUYING

Unquestionably, brokers are deeply nested in social networks. But even the most attuned brokers rarely have com-

plete or perfect information. Targets' socioeconomic profiles are susceptible to short-run shocks and shifting economic prospects that brokers may or cannot observe. Their electoral profiles are composed of behaviors that are difficult to monitor with certainty (Nichter 2008) and attitudes that are fluid (partisanship, ideological attachments) where clientelistic voter linkages prevail (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 2010). Hence, brokers must draw inferences about future behavior from information about fluid attitudes and past electoral behavior. But since that information is often imperfect or incomplete, brokers' predictions are imprecise which makes, paraphrasing Dixit and Londregan (1996), their "buckets" inevitably "leaky." Our model adapts to this reality by positing new assumptions about targets and brokers.

On the target side, we assume the choice to sell one's vote (or not) reflects a trade-off between economic and political benefits and psychic costs. The latter are quite large for true "democrats," citizens who comprehend and value liberal democracy's core elements—free, fair, and inclusive elections, the civil liberties competition requires, and the basic institutions and processes needed for checks and balances. Thus, democrats should make particularly poor targets for clientelistic vote buying. On the broker side, we assume brokers take a catholic approach to targeting decisions. That is, they employ any and all information about the likelihood of converting a would-be target into a certain core voter. Such pragmatism matches brokers' incentive structures; since their careers depend on turning out supporters to rallies and elections, all strategies are on the table (Szwarcberg 2009, 2013). As one broker, put it, "This is very simple. You are worth as much as the amount of people you can mobilize . . . I tell you, what you need to do is simple. How you do it, that is strategy" (cited in Swarcberg 2013, 14). In short, it does not behoove brokers to neglect information that could make their targeting more efficient, and, as we argue, targeting democrats can be comparatively costly.

Why Democrats Make Unlikely Vote Traffickers

True democrats support inclusive political participation, fair and free elections, and institutional checks on political power even when it is inconvenient. They defend free speech for extremists or rivals and favor checks on the powers of even the presidents they support (Carlin and Singer 2011). Democrats should thus see vote buying as a direct affront to their political belief system. On the other hand, pejorative reactions to vote buying are less likely from citizens who are, at best, ambivalent to democratic procedures and institutions. For them, democratic institutions are often viewed instrumentally, as a means to an end; democrats value democracy intrinsically, as an end in itself. So while vote buy-

ing threatens the political processes democrats hold dear, rendering its monetary benefits meaningless, to less democratic citizens vote buying may represent a welcome material boon requiring little sacrifice in return. If this is true, democrats should hold the key participative act of democracy—voting—more sacred than citizens less enthusiastic about democracy. And this could alter the calculus of voting.

Riker and Ordeshook provide a rationale by which democrats could be less susceptible to vote buying. They aver a sense of civic duty offsets the costs of voting given the low probability of casting the decisive vote. Civic duty comprises “positive satisfactions” derived from: (1) adhering to the ethic of voting, (2) affirming a partisan preference, (3) informing oneself about if and how to vote, and demonstrating one’s (4) efficacy in and (5) allegiance to the political system (1968, 28). According to their canonical model, then, a major driver of voting is the intrinsic contentment of participating in the democratic process.

In this vein, democrats should be less receptive to vote buying because voting brings them comparatively more satisfaction. Any material benefit electoral rewards might bring them would be offset by the loss of the psychic benefits or “satisfactions” (“D-term”) of casting an independent, “unbrokered” ballot. Moreover, true democrats who sell their votes would suffer psychic costs—guilt, shame, remorse—of abandoning their core political belief system. This cognitive dissonance would persist even if they accepted benefits to vote for their preferred candidate or party. Their less democratic counterparts, with smaller civic-duty “D terms,” on the other hand, appreciate the material benefits, suffer little to no duress from casting a brokered vote, and are immune to cognitive dissonance since vote buying does not belie their beliefs. This logic comports with Vicente’s (2014) finding that voter-education campaigns using legalistic and democratic messages make vote buying less acceptable.

Why Brokers Avoid Targeting Democrats

Brokers want to avoid democrats because they are relatively costly on three scores. The most important, but least obvious, of these is that targeting democrats can produce electoral backlash, or “audience” costs. This logic parallels Weitz-Shapiro’s (2012, N.d.) theory that some Argentine candidates reject clientelistic strategies because they run counter to potential supporters’ democratic values: “Democratic objections to clientelism may take a variety of forms . . . Citizens who attach a high value to the integrity of the democratic process may . . . object to the fact that clientelism exploits poor voters and prevents clients from enjoying autonomy over their choices at the ballot box” (N.d., 75–76). Hence, brokers avoid democrats because of

audience costs: clientelistic linkage strategies repulse potential supporters.

Yet the moral repugnance of clientelism may, to some extent, transcend socioeconomic and electoral profiles (Cohen, Faughnan, and Zechmeister n.d.; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Indeed 43% of the poorest Argentines find parties’ distribution of clothing, food, or money “totally unacceptable.”² Among respondents who have an “excellent” opinion of the Peronist Party³—Argentina’s best-oiled machine party—39% felt the same way. Moreover, this sentiment is shared by 49 and 42% of those who voted Peronist in the last presidential and legislative elections,⁴ respectively. Combining socioeconomics with electoral behavior, poor Peronist voters in presidential and legislative elections find it totally unacceptable for parties to distribute material goods at rates of 36 and 39%, respectively. And interacting socioeconomics with machine proximity, 35% of poor respondents with an excellent opinion of the Peronists hold the same view. Thus, brokers who rely on socioeconomic or electoral profiles alone or in combination as heuristics for “good targets” run nonnegligible risks of incurring audience costs.

Targeting democrats can raise opportunity costs and, relatedly, overall unit costs. If a democrat swiftly rejects a vote-buying offer, the broker’s opportunity cost is nonzero but minimal. Yet if staunch democrats require more sustained contact to be convinced to sell their votes, the opportunity costs of targeting them climb. And because highly value democracy and its institutions, the price of their votes is relatively higher (Luna 2006). Stated another way, democratic attitudes raise targets’ reservation “utility” and thus the costs of buying their votes or turnout (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2013). As a woman from the lower-working-class city of Villa Ballester in Greater Buenos Aires put it, “If I give you a ballot so that you vote for me, and I give you the 20 pesos, I don’t let you think. You get to the voting booth and you vote for me. If that person knows

2. Data from Calvo and Murillo’s (2013) nationally representative survey of 2,800 face-to-face interviews in cities (pop. \geq 10,000). The item reads, “In your opinion, how appropriate is it that political parties distribute clothing, food, and money?” Answers range: “totally unacceptable” (1–2), “not very acceptable” (3–4), “acceptable” (5–6), “very acceptable” (7–8), “totally acceptable” (9–10). Socioeconomic levels reflect Argentina’s NES (*nivel económico social*) scale which groups citizens A–E, with three subgroupings at C and two at D. Poor refers to the two lowest subgroupings (D2 and E). We thank Ernesto Calvo for the data.

3. “On a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is awful (*pésima*) and 10 is excellent, what is your opinion of the following parties and people? The Justicialist Party”; 9 and 10 coded “excellent.”

4. Calculations include both all plausible spontaneous answers and guided responses.

what's right, they aren't going to vote for me. I have 1000, 1,000,000 pesos for them and that person is not going to vote for me—if they think about it, they will not vote for me” (*author citation removed*). So even if a broker ultimately succeeds in buying a democrat's vote, her cost-benefit analysis must consider how many less democratic votes can be bought with the same time and resources.

To lower these costs, we propose brokers can and do consider potential targets' democratic attitudes and detect them from the social networks in which they are enmeshed. Conversations about historical or current events and figures are revealing. Justifications or repudiations of an authoritarian ancien régime expose general orientations to freedoms and rights. Where there are power struggles over press freedom and checks and balances, support for actors on either side reflects one's commitment to democratic institutions, procedures, and processes. Discriminatory comments or debates about the political rights and civil liberties marginalized groups should enjoy indicate targets' democratic values. Likewise, news of individuals mobilizing in support of or resistance to any rights-related issue should reach brokers via networks.

Like the contents of socioeconomic and electoral profiles, the contents of democratic attitude profiles can be fluid or hard to observe. Thus, even the inferences highly attuned brokers draw about democratic attitudes are uncertain. Our model, however, does not require complete or perfect information; only that brokers use whatever they have learned or inferred about potential targets' democratic attitudes to complement or supplement whatever they have learned or inferred about their socioeconomic and electoral profiles.

In sum, there are good reasons why true democrats make comparatively bad vote-buying targets. To them, the cost-benefit analysis of participating in elections in an unbrokered fashion leans against vote selling. To brokers, targeting democrats is relatively costly electorally and in terms of resources. In our model, democrats signal that their vote is nonnegotiable, and this message travels loud and clear through social networks to party operatives. Brokers figure this information into their targeting decisions as follows. Imagine scarcity dictates that a broker can only offer to buy the vote of citizen A or citizen B. Both potential targets live in the same neighborhood, have the same socioeconomic status, identify with the incumbent political party and subscribe to its ideology, and are equally likely to vote. The broker gleans from her social network that A is strongly committed to democratic principles but B is not. Given the choice between two otherwise similar prospective targets, *ceteris paribus*, our model predicts brokers will invest scarce resources in B. Note this logic extends, rather than contra-

dicts, extant models of clientelistic vote buying focused primarily on socioeconomic and/or electoral profiles.

DATA AND MEASURES

To test the observable implications of these claims, we use survey data from the Argentina AmericasBarometer, a face-to-face nationally representative probabilistic sample of voting-age adults ($n = 1410$) fielded January–April 2010.⁵ We focus on Argentina because clientelism has become widespread there since the Peronist *Partido Justicialista* (PJ) shifted away from labor-based party organization and mobilization (Levitsky 2003). Argentina has many commonalities with developing democracies such as institutional frailty, political instability, and mixed democratic attitudes (Levitsky and Murillo 2005; Lodola 2011). Not surprisingly, the case continues to inspire many prominent studies on distributive politics. So if democratic attitudes deter targeting in Argentina, they will have passed a test in a paradigmatic case and one fairly representative of clientelistic contexts.

By way of illustration, consider the distribution of our dependent variable, measured by responses to the question: “In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something, like a favor, food, or any other benefit or object in return for your vote or support? Has this happened often, sometimes or never?” About 18% claim to have been targeted for vote buying (7.5%, “frequently” plus 10.5% “at least once”), third highest in the Americas (Lodola 2011). The sheer number of targets establishes the significance of vote buying in Argentina and lends our analysis variation and statistical power. This measure's major advantage is that it asks if respondents have been *offered*—not *accepted*—electoral rewards and, hence, mostly avoids social desirability problems associated with vote-selling questions. As a validity check, 49% of targets fall in the lowest income ranges, consistent with prior studies.

Our measures of democratic attitudes reflect Dahl's (1971) argument that polyarchy requires representative institutions to aggregate preferences, accountable executives, and juridical institutions to interpret the constitution and uphold the law; otherwise political and civil freedoms are hollow and responsive government, citizen control of the agenda, and effective participation remain distant ideals.

5. We thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available. Question wording in Table A1 in the online appendix.

This definition suggests ideal-typical “democrats” should fully embrace each of these essential elements, but other citizens may hold ambivalent and, potentially, negative attitudinal profiles towards them.

We identify democratic attitudinal profiles by analyzing attitudes towards inclusive political and civil freedoms and the institutional safeguards that guarantee them by checking power vertically (between governors and the governed) and horizontally (between government branches). Our attitudinal indicators, described below, are summed into indices and normalized (see Table A1 in the online appendix for descriptives).⁶

Public Contestation. Attitudes towards (1) laws prohibiting (a) protests and (b) the formation of social movements; (2) government censorship of (c) television programs, (d) books in public libraries, and (e) critical media; and (3) preference for electing leaders by popular vote versus unelected leaders. More liberal responses are coded higher ($\alpha = .712$).

Inclusive Participation. Tolerability of citizens who speak poorly of the regime (1) voting, (2) conducting peaceful political protests, (3) running for public office, and (4) voicing political views on television; and (5) whether homosexuals should be allowed to run for public office. More inclusive orientations are scored higher ($\alpha = .846$).

Limits on Executive Authority. Attitudes towards executive authority via: (1) “It is necessary for the progress of this country that our presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties;” (2) “When Congress hinders the work of our presidents it should be ignored;” (3) “When the Supreme Court hinders the work of the government they should be ignored;” and (4) “The people should govern directly not through elected representatives.” High values signal preferences to restrict executive authority ($\alpha = .846$).

Institutions and Processes. Justifiability of suspending operation of (1) the legislature or (2) the Supreme Court. Answers rejecting these actions are coded high ($\alpha = .818$).

Focusing on Dahl’s twin dimensions, the first index captures support for the political and civil freedoms necessary for public contestation; the second captures support for extending these rights to all. The third and fourth indices focus on checks and balances. Respectively, they tap support for limiting executive latitude in placing the popular will above parties and state institutions and respect for checks on executive power.

Democratic attitudes are often measured by forming scales from various items or factor analyzing them to iden-

6. Our approach draws heavily on Carlin and Singer (2011).

tify latent variables. Empirically, these approaches assume the variables align on a single linear dimension. Analyses and discussion of Figure 1, Table 1, and in Tables A14–16 in the online appendix cast doubt on this assumption. Theoretically, linear approaches disregard “democrats with adjectives” (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007) who value some of democracy’s core elements more (or less) than others. For these reasons, scholars employ cluster analysis to render categorical profiles of democratic attitudes (Carlin 2011; Carlin and Singer 2011; Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). The distinction is that “while factor analysis allows us to discern how *different variables* hang together *across cases*, cluster analysis reveals how *cases* hang together *across different variables*” (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007, 8; emphasis added). Cluster analysis classifies cases using similarity measures (numerical distances) across a range of variables. Here, it classifies respondents into the same democratic attitudinal profile (cluster) who are most similar (numerically proximate) to each other on the four indices above but most dissimilar (numerically distant) to respondents in other clusters.

We explore the democratic attitude profiles in the sample using agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis. The analysis finds a three-cluster solution (see Table A2 in the online appendix).⁷ Table 1 reports the clusters’ mean tendencies on each index as liberal, illiberal, or ambivalent (scores within a half standard deviation of 0), and Figure 1 plots the relationships between them. More democratic scores are above the gray 0 axis. “Democrats” post liberal scores on all four indicators and are the most populous. “Ambivalents” hold illiberal attitudes towards public contestation and inclusiveness and ambivalence to limiting the executive. Yet they reject the executive coup-related actions (*autogolpes*) depicted in the Institutions and Processes index. “Nondemocrats” hold illiberal or ambivalent attitudes towards all dimensions of democracy.

DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND THE FIVE SATISFACTIONS OF VOTING

According to our theory, democrats are more likely to reject vote-buying offers than ambivalents or nondemocrats because they derive more “satisfaction” from voting. To gauge the validity of this proposition, Table 2 reports bivariate associations with variables that approximate, as closely as possible, Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) five satisfactions.

7. We use squared Euclidean distance (similarity measure) and Ward’s algorithm, which calculates the sum of squared distances from each respondent to the mean of all variables and minimizes the sum of squares of any two hypothetical clusters that can be formed at each step. Duda and Hart’s (1973) stopping rule determines the cluster solution.




Figure 1. Profiles of Democratic Support in Argentina. Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis conducted with squared Euclidean distances and Ward’s algorithm. Duda and Hart’s stopping rule determined the cluster solution. Entries are cluster means; standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 1. Cluster Means: Democratic Attitudes by Profiles of Democratic Support in Argentina

Democratic Attitudinal Index	Democratic Attitudinal Profile		
	Democrat	Ambivalent	Non-Democrat
Public Contestation	.54 (.77) Liberal	-.48 (.94) Illiberal	-.47 (1.25) Ambivalent
Inclusive Participation	.86 (.45) Liberal	-.74 (.71) Illiberal	-.46 (.97) Ambivalent
Limits on Executive Authority	.65 (.40) Liberal	-.42 (1.04) Ambivalent	-.91 (.92) Illiberal
Institutions and Processes	.28 (0) Liberal	.28 (0) Liberal	-3.21 (1.12) Illiberal
Percent of cases classified	49	44	8

Note—Entries are cluster means; standard deviations in parentheses.

We capture the first of these, “compliance with the ethic of voting,” with having voted in the last presidential election. Since recent Argentine presidents have summarily pardoned those who violate mandatory voting laws, this is a viable proxy. It is positively, if weakly, related with a fully democratic attitudinal profile. On the second satisfaction—“affirming allegiance to the political system”—democrats are more likely than ambivalents and nondemocrats (combined

to favor *electoral* democracy over having a strong but *un-elected* leader and more strongly prefer “democracy” (despite its problems) to any other political system. This is not tautological since our attitudinal profiles contain no items that mention “democracy” outright. Democrats are also more supportive of major state institutions. Compared to their less democratic counterparts, democrats derive more satisfaction from “affirming a partisan preference” insofar as

Table 2. Democrats Derive More Satisfactions from Voting than Counterparts

Compliance with the Ethic of Voting Voted in last presidential election (0) No (1) Yes	Tests of Association Tetrachoric $\rho = .237$ Two-sided exact $p = .0000$
Affirming Allegiance to the Political System There are people who say that we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, is always best. What do you think? (0) We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected; (1) Electoral democracy is the best	Tetrachoric $\rho = .497$ Two-sided exact $p = .0000$
Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree System Support Index (Seligson 1983)	Polychoric $\rho = .527$ Difference = -2.406 Pr($T < t$) = 0.071
Affirming a Partisan Preference If the next presidential elections were this week, what would you do? (0) Not vote <i>or</i> cast blank/null vote (1) Vote for the candidate or party of the president <i>or</i> of the opposition	Tetrachoric $\rho = .232$ Two-sided exact $p = .0001$
Democracy can exist without political parties. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree	Polychoric $\rho = -.345$
Informing Oneself about If and How to Vote How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (0) None, (1) Little, (2) Some, (3) A lot About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? (1) Daily, (2) A few times a week, (3) A few times a month, (4) Rarely, (5) Never	Polychoric $\rho = -.227$ Polychoric $\rho = -.137$
Affirming One's Efficacy in the Political System You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree	Difference = $-.379$ Pr($T < t$) = 0.0009 Polychoric $\rho = .130$

they are more devoted to voting for a candidate or party if elections were held this week as opposed to abstaining or nullifying the ballot. Democrats are also less apt to believe democracy can exist without parties. For the fourth satisfaction, informing oneself and deciding on a particular candidate, democrats claim more interest in politics and pay closer attention to the news than ambivalents and nondemocrats. Finally, and in line with the fifth satisfaction, democrats feel more efficacious vis-à-vis key issues facing the country.

Overall, democrats appear to derive greater satisfaction from voting than citizens with partially or nondemocratic profiles. This evidence bolsters our claim that democrats are less receptive to vote buying because they place (relatively) more value on casting an "unbrokered" vote. Yet given the

modesty of this evidence and our theoretical priors, we suspect civic duty proxies for democratic attitudes, which play a larger, more direct role.

COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Assessing the seemingly simple question—do democrats make bad vote-buying targets—requires mitigating selection biases on observables and unobservables. If something besides democrats' attitudinal profiles makes them unlikely targets for electoral rewards, it will bias our estimates. And if being targeted for vote buying (or being ignored by brokers) influences one's democratic attitudes, or if we omit factors related to democratic attitudes that also predict electoral rewards targeting from the equation, our estimates will be biased. We combat these threats to inference with

two complementary approaches: (1) balancing and regression and (2) instrumental variables. Both emulate a randomized trial—the former by balancing on covariates with regression weights, the latter by using an excluded instrument to capture the exogenous component of the endogenous regressor to identify its effect on the outcome.

Mitigating Selection Bias on Observables:

Balancing and Regression

We deal with selection bias on observables by first sorting respondents into a “treatment” group—those who have democratic attitude profiles (democrats)—and a “control” group—those who do not (ambivalents and nondemocrats). Then we balance the two groups on demographic and theoretical confounders before estimating the relationship between democratic attitudes and being targeted for vote buying with regression analysis.⁸

Demographic confounders include three indicators brokers may take to signal a willingness to sell one’s vote: education, having school-aged children, and skin color (for coding see Table A1 in the online appendix). The less educated attach less stigma to vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2013); parents of small children face pressure to provide; darker-skinned citizens are more apt to face social exclusion and lack channels of representation. No other demographics in the survey correlate with democratic attitudes (Table A4 in the online appendix).

Several theoretical confounders map onto our central proposition: given the choice between targets who are equally wealthy, loyal, proximate to the machine network, and likely to vote for machine-party candidates, brokers would rather target those who are at best ambivalent to democratic institutions, values, and norms over individuals who fully support them. Hence the covariates below control for the most central factors in the distributive politics literature.

Economic resources are measured in wealth quintiles derived from a weighted index of household assets (Córdova 2009). Partisan and ideological proximity to the machine are captured with Peronist party (PJ or FpV) identification and job evaluations of Peronist President Cristina Fernández, respectively. While the latter is not strictly ideology, the low content of Left-Right labels in Argentina (Zechmeister 2006) coupled with high president-opposition

8. To the extent the groups have no observable differences, selection bias is removed, and the analysis approximates the experimental benchmark. This strengthens our claim of causality and lends confidence that neither outliers nor model choice are driving the results (Hainmueller 2012; Ho et al. 2007; Tables A5–A6 in the online appendix).

polarization make it a sensible proxy. We tap network proximity with indicators of how frequently respondents attend political party meetings and whether they worked for a party or candidate during the last presidential campaign.⁹

Two dummy variables proxy for machine-loyal potential voters and disloyal certain voters. The first indicates voting for Peronist presidential candidate, Cristina Fernández, in 2007.¹⁰ The second gauges future machine support by identifying those who would vote for Fernández in a hypothetical election held this week. One concern is that these variables are posttreatment, meaning democratic attitudes could affect vote choices. Given the heterogeneity of Fernández’s electoral and parliamentary support at this time, we do not expect—nor find—a relationship between them and democratic attitudes.¹¹ Thus including them (or not) makes no empirical difference (Table A3, Model 2B, in the online appendix).

Entropy balancing achieved balanced treatment and control groups on the first three moments of the covariate distributions (Hainmueller 2012; Tables A5–A6 in the online appendix). We estimate probabilistic regressions on the balanced data to test whether democratic attitudes repel vote-buying offers; the dependent variable is scored 1 if the respondent was a vote-buying target, 0 if not. Results are reported in Table 3. Model 1 balances on demographic covariates only; Model 2 balances on theoretical confounders as well. Since covariate coefficients are uninterpretable, we present them in Table A3 in the online appendix.

In both models, we observe a negative relationship between democratic attitudes and receiving vote-buying offers. Both coefficients are statistically significant at conservative levels. This finding resonates with our contention that democrats are less attractive vote-buying targets than their ambivalent or nondemocratic counterparts. Substantively, being a democrat reduces the probability of receiving a vote-buying offer by roughly 10% according to postestimation discrete-change simulations of Model 2 holding other variables at their means. In sum, this first-cut evidence is consistent with our theory.

9. These questions do not reference the machine party, but this element is captured with the partisan and ideological proximity measures above and the voting covariates below.

10. Reported vote choice can suffer from pro-incumbent overreporting and poor recall. These concerns are assuaged somewhat since Fernández won 45% of the actual vote and 40% of respondents who reported voting said they voted for her (± 2.5 , 95% c.i.).

11. Voted for Fernández in 2007: $r = -.05$, $p = .07$; would vote for Fernández: $r = .01$, $p = .80$.

Table 3. Democratic Attitudes and Receiving a Vote-Buying Offer, Entropy Balancing, and Probabilistic Regression

	Model 1	Model 2
	Balancing on Demographic Confounders	Balancing on Demographic and Theoretical Confounders
	Coefficient (s.e.)	Coefficient (s.e.)
Democrat Attitudes Profile	-0.547* (0.110)	-0.427* (0.117)
Constant	-1.280* (0.223)	-1.260* (0.278)
LR χ^2	36.73	55.78
Pseudo-R ²	0.050	0.086
<i>n</i>	930	862

* $p < .05$, two-tailed tests.

Mitigating Selection Bias on Unobservables: Instrumental Variables

While the analyses above suggest democrats are less likely targets of electoral rewards after removing selection bias on observables, bias from selection on unobservables still lurks. And democratic attitudes may be endogenous: once targeted for electoral rewards, individuals could sour on democracy and lose faith in its tenets; not being targeted could reinforce democratic attitudes. We address these issues with instrumental variables regression. Excluded instruments must satisfy two conditions: (1) be correlated with the endogenous regressor, democratic attitudes, ideally on theoretical grounds and (2) be uncorrelated with the (unobserved) error term.

Our excluded instrument stems from this question: "How worried are you that you or one of your family members will be a victim of a violent terrorist attack in the next twelve months?"¹² A strong correlation ($\rho = .40$, $s.e. = .04$)¹³ between the instrument and democratic attitudes constitutes direct evidence that the instrument satisfies the first condition. Research showing that terrorist threat raises authoritarian attitudes and, potentially, places democracy at risk

12. "(1) Very worried, (2) somewhat worried, (3) a little worried, (4) not at all worried, and (5) I have not thought much about it." Results are robust to excluding those answering (5).

13. This correlation is slightly higher than the one Stokes et al. (2013) report between their instrument (father's partisanship) and endogenous regressor (benefit receipt).

(Merolla and Zechmeister 2009), provides a theoretical intuition for this observed relationship.¹⁴ Being targeted for electoral rewards should not raise perceived terrorist threat, and, indeed, the two are uncorrelated ($\rho = -.070$, $s.e. = .040$).

The second condition, that the instrument is unrelated to the regression error term, defies direct tests. Rather it requires indirect evidence of the plausibility of the exclusion restriction and independence assumption to place the instrument along the spectrum of the plausibility of randomness (Dunning 2012). Here the exclusion restriction assumes perceptions of personal terrorist threat only affect the likelihood a respondent is targeted for vote buying through democratic attitudes. We can imagine two pathways by which perceived terrorist threat might influence the receipt of vote-buying offers. First, anxiety over terrorism may reduce one's life satisfaction. To a broker, such discontent could signal general apathy compatible with vote selling. Second, feeling threatened and insecure could damage one's perceived economic prospects. Brokers might seize such opportunities to offer electoral rewards as a way to offset expected losses. We address these possible violations by including additional variables in the instrumental variables regression model.

In this context, the independence assumption is that terrorist threat perceptions are unrelated to unobserved causes of rewards targeting. To test this assumption's observable implications, we conduct randomization checks between the instrument and the confounders in the balancing analysis. That most of the coefficients and F-tests are insignificant (Table A7 in the online appendix) bolsters the independence assumption's plausibility. Yet three variables appear in violation: Woman, Wealth, and FPV/PJ (Peronist) Party Identification. We address the matter by including these variables in the instrumental variables models (below) for two reasons.

First, Sovey and Green note, "In observational studies, the inclusion of covariates usually makes more plausible the assumption that the near-random instrumental variable is independent of the disturbance" (2011, 189, fn. 1). But if the covariates are not exogenous, their inclusion may bias our estimates (Sovey and Green 2011). Being offered electoral rewards cannot determine one's gender, wealth, or parti-

14. The bloody 1994 AMIA attack (85 killed, over 300 injured) has cast long shadows. Fully 65 and 42% of Argentines in 2002 and 2007, respectively, viewed terrorism as a "very big problem" (Pew Global Attitudes Project; cited in Merolla and Zechmeister 2009, 6–8, Table 1.1). In 2010, over 20% of Argentine AmericasBarometer respondents remained "somewhat" or "very" worried about a potential terrorist attack.

sanship. Even if one *accepts* rewards—which differs from our outcome of interest, being *targeted*—gifts of the assets in the wealth index (see above) are far rarer than small gifts of cash, groceries, and nondurables. Finally, Stokes et al. (2013, Chapter 2) marshal compelling evidence from Argentina and elsewhere that party loyalty is exogenous to vote buying. If *selling* one's vote does not increase party loyalty, then neither should the less compromising case of simply being *targeted*. Below, we show that including Peronist identification does not significantly alter our estimates of the effect of democratic attitudes on being targeted.

Secondly, including these covariates, especially Peronist partisanship, in the instrumental variables models bolsters the exclusion restriction.¹⁵ Perceptions of terrorism not only undermine democratic attitudes but also boost support for charismatic leaders (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). A strong association between terrorist threat perceptions and FPV/PJ Party Identification (Table A7 in the online appendix) means we cannot rule out this possibility. Thus, adding this variable to the instrumental variables model at once addresses independence assumption violations and shores up the exclusion restriction.

ANALYSIS

Turning now to the instrumental variables regression (2SLS) models, results reported in Table 4 offer further support for the argument that democratic attitudes reduce the likelihood of being targeted for vote buying. Point estimates for democratic attitude profiles are negative and precisely estimated in all four model specifications. Model 3 is the simplest, including only the democratic attitudes profile on the right-hand side.

As noted, our exclusion restriction is violated if perceived terrorist threat affects who is targeted by pathways other than democratic attitudes. Life satisfaction and personal economic prospects represent two such paths for which Models 4–6 control. Life satisfaction and a rosy economic outlook are positively related to democratic attitudes in stage one but unrelated to targeting in stage two. Democrats remain relatively worse targets.

Model 5 adds the covariates that call the independence assumption into question: Wealth, Woman, and PJ/FPV (Peronist) Party Identification. First-stage results suggest the wealthy are more democratic but find no partisan or gender differences. Though we feel confident that Peronist partisanship is exogenous to vote-buying targeting, Model 6 shows that excluding PJ/FPV Party Identification changes the estimates of Democrat Attitudes Profile very little. Thus

15. We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.

any bias induced is minimal. Together, Models 4–6 make the exclusion restriction and independence assumptions more plausible and show steady support for our expectations.

The substantive effects of these models are about twice the size of those based on the regressions on balanced data (Models 1 and 2). Specifically, being a democrat decreases the probability of receiving a vote-buying offer by 20.3, 22.4, 20.8, and 21.9%, in Models 3–6, respectively. So while all four models reveal a strong and statistically significant negative relationship between being a democrat and being targeted, endogeneity and/or selection on unobservables creates severe bias. By purging it with an empirically defensible instrument and including variables to shore up the key assumption upon which this estimation technique rests, we gain confidence in our central claim that democrats are less likely vote-buying targets.

Our confidence in these findings is further bolstered by large first-stage F-statistics in all four models suggesting the instrument is not weak.¹⁶ Additionally, the models employ limited-information (LIML) estimators which are more robust to weak instruments than OLS (Stock and Yogo 2005). The online appendix also reports the results of the following robustness checks. Tables A9–A10 show the effects hold, and are larger with, two alternative instruments: (1) perceived likelihood of terrorist attacks in Argentina in the next year and (2) support for the rights of homosexual couples to marry. We also estimate the models on the balanced data (Tables A11–A12) and with the four indicators in the cluster analysis entered separately (Table A14). Additionally, we estimate Model 5 using three linear operationalizations of the four indicators in the cluster analysis: (1) factor scores from the first principal component, (2) factor scores from the second principal component, and (3) an additive scale (Table A18). Lastly, we estimate conditional mixed-process models that combine two probit equations in a seemingly unrelated regression with robust standard errors (Roodman 2011) (Table A19).

How do the effects of democratic attitudes compare to other theoretical drivers of clientelistic vote buying? Though distinct measures prohibit perfect comparisons, they are nonetheless illustrative. Stokes (2005) reports the probability of being influenced by a reward is .13 for a *poor* person and .02 for a *wealthy* person. For Dunning and Stokes (2008), among *core supporters*, *potential voters* are 4 percentage points more likely to receive awards than *certain voters*; among *nonsupporters*, it falls from .03 for *certain voters* to

16. With robust standard errors Kleibergen-Paap (2006), Wald rk F-statistics are appropriate. These values exceed Stock and Yogo's (2005) weak-identification 10% critical values.

Table 4. Democratic Attitudes and Receiving a Vote-Buying Offer, IV Regression

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Coefficient (r.s.e.)	Coefficient (r.s.e.)	Coefficient (r.s.e.)	Coefficient (r.s.e.)
	Second-Stage (DV: Received Vote-Buying Offer)			
Democrat Attitudes Profile	-0.203* (0.070)	-0.224* (0.089)	-0.208* (0.093)	-0.219* (0.092)
Personal economic prospects		0.008 (0.019)	0.013 (0.020)	0.008 (0.019)
Life satisfaction		0.007 (0.018)	0.002 (0.017)	0.007 (0.018)
Wealth			-0.0003 (0.011)	-0.0002 (0.011)
Woman			0.025 (0.025)	0.019 (0.025)
PJ/FPV Party Identification			0.077 (0.050)	
Constant	0.248* (0.038)	0.237* (0.038)	0.213* (0.042)	0.227* (0.041)
	First-Stage (DV: Democratic Attitudes Profile)			
Perceived personal terrorist threat	0.144* (0.012)	0.126* (0.014)	0.121* (0.014)	0.122* (0.014)
Personal economic prospects		0.072* (0.023)	0.064* (0.024)	0.061* (0.023)
Life satisfaction		0.056* (0.020)	0.042* (0.021)	0.038 (0.020)
Wealth			0.053* (0.012)	0.050* (0.012)
Woman			-0.018 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.032)
PJ/FPV Party Identification			-0.070 (0.063)	
Constant	-0.014 (0.043)	-0.147* (0.047)	-0.240* (0.053)	-0.147* (0.047)
Kleibergen-Paap rk F-statistic	136.68*	81.00*	71.94*	75.10*
<i>n</i>	923	828	799	828

* $p < .05$, two-tailed test.

almost zero for *nonvoters*. According to Nichter's (2008) Kernel density function, the probability of receiving rewards for *supporters* was about .08, with second, third, and fourth modes at .09, .06, and .12, respectively. Calvo and Murillo (2013) find Chilean *partisans*' expectations of receiving a handout from a party decreases 31.5% over the range of *ideological distance*; in Argentina, a standard-deviation change in *knowing activists* among *PJ supporters* increases the expectation of receiving a public job by 8.65 percentage points. Finally, Finan and Schechter (2013) report a standard-deviation change in reciprocity increases the likelihood of being targeted by 9.6 percentage points.

In sum, the substantive effects of democratic attitudes on vote-buying targeting are comparable to, and in some cases exceed, others in the distributive politics literature.

CONCLUSION

Resource scarcity implies party brokers must whittle a large list of potential targets down to a select few. Scholars of distributive politics have identified key socioeconomic and electoral profiles brokers use to identify targets. Building on these models, this study proposes that brokers can and should use information about citizens' democratic attitudinal profiles to help discern good vote-selling prospects from

bad ones. Empirically, we find that citizens who are firmly committed to key democratic processes and norms are targeted far less for vote buying than their less committed counterparts, even after controlling for confounders. Hence this study advances the study of distributive politics in several ways.

As a theoretical matter, it broadens a debate hitherto dominated by socioeconomic and electoral profiles—party affinities, network proximity, propensity to vote, or some combination these (see the review in Stokes et al. 2013). Note that our proposition requires no new technologies on the part of brokers: potential targets' democratic values are transmitted through the same mechanisms as socioeconomic status and the political preferences and behavioral inclinations described in extant models of vote buying—friendships, neighborly interaction, and conversations over long periods of time. Brokers tap into these social networks and, if successful, decipher these signals and base their distributive strategies accordingly. To the extent that electoral rewards serve as a form of “organization building” (Stokes et al. 2013), democratic attitudes deepen our understanding of how brokers select recipients of targeted rewards among the sea of citizens in a soup kitchen, packing a meeting hall, overflowing a bus, and forming a lengthy line outside his or her office.

Methodologically, we seek to mitigate well-known but often ignored threats to causal inference in observational studies. Through entropy balancing coupled with regression, we attenuate selection bias on observable covariates of democratic attitudes. Happily, this approach raises the goodness of fit between our methods and our theoretical expectation that, all else equal, citizens who value basic democratic norms, principles, and processes are less likely vote-buying targets. By instrumenting, we attempt to deal with omitted variables and the potential endogeneity of democratic attitudes to vote buying. The relationship is robust to various coding decisions, alternative instruments, and estimation techniques. Together, these analyses bolster our assertion of a causal relationship between democratic attitudes and vote buying and give us traction on competing explanations.

Normatively speaking, many would argue vote buying throttles political representation, responsiveness, and accountability (e.g., Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010; but see Kitschelt and Kselman 2013 and Stokes et al. 2013). Considering that clientelistic mobilization continues to prosper and play an increasingly important role in the politics of developing democracies, our findings require the attention of academics and policy makers alike. Indeed, they imply parties' choice between programmatic and clientelistic linkages reflects, to some extent, a strategic

decision conditioned upon the distribution of support for democratic rules of the game in the electorate, or at least certain segments of it. If so, it would illuminate previously obscured linkages between mass democratic attitudes, party mobilization strategies, and democratic ideals and perhaps inform policy solutions aimed at curtailing vote trafficking.

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